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In Timbs v. Indiana the Supreme Court considered whether the Eighth Amendment’s bar on “excessive
ﬁnes” (h ps://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/18pdf/17-1091_5536.pdf) is incorporated against the
states under the Fourteenth Amendment. Timbs v. Indiana addressed another persistent question that has
appeared on bar exams for years: “What provisions in the Bill of Rights have not yet been ‘incorporated’
(h ps://www.westlaw.com/Document/I8cadc2c149f311db99a18fc28eb0d9ae/View/FullText.html?
transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=cblt1.0) against the States?”

Tyson Timbs (h ps://ij.org/case/timbs-v-indiana/)
Tyson Timbs was convicted in Indiana for selling four grams of heroin
(h ps://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/18pdf/17-1091_5536.pdf). The state sought forfeiture of his
$42,000 Land Rover because it had been used to transport the drugs. The state trial court ruled that
“[w]hile the negative impact of [drug] traﬃcking … is substantial … a forfeiture of approximately four
times the maximum monetary ﬁne is disproportional” under the Eighth Amendment (maximum
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permissible ﬁne of $10,000). The Indiana Court of Appeals agreed that the excessive ﬁnes clause
(h ps://1.next.westlaw.com/Document/I172645db978411e6b92bf4314c15140f/View/FullText.html?
transitionType=UniqueDocItem&contextData=(sc.Default)&userEnteredCitation=62+N.E.3d+472) should
be applied (incorporated) against the states. But the Indiana Supreme Court reversed
(h ps://1.next.westlaw.com/Document/I172645db978411e6b92bf4314c15140f/View/FullText.html?
transitionType=UniqueDocItem&contextData=(sc.Default)&userEnteredCitation=62+N.E.3d+472)—
ruling that it would not “impose federal obligations on the State that the federal government itself has
not mandated.” A persistent split on the question, involving at least 18 states’ courts
(h ps://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia01d68914b3611daa926e0f707ed0a55/View/FullText.html?
transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=cblt1.0) and two federal courts of
appeals, led the U.S. Supreme Court to grant certiorari. Until Timbs v. Indiana, the U.S. Supreme Court
(h ps://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/17/171091/33939/20180131162915070_Petition%20for%20a%20Writ%20of%20Certiorari%20Timbs%20et%20al
%20v%20State%20of%20Indiana.pdf) had never speciﬁcally ruled that the excessive ﬁnes clause applies
to the states through incorporation.
“Incorporation” is the legal doctrine that holds certain protections found in the federal Bill of Rights may
also be applied to conduct by the states
(h ps://1.next.westlaw.com/Document/I8cadc2c149f311db99a18fc28eb0d9ae/View/FullText.html?
transitionType=Default&contextData=%28sc.Default%29), by “incorporating” those protections into the
“[n]o State shall … deny due process” guarantee of the 14th Amendment. In McDonald v. Chicago, the
court ruled that the Second Amendment applies against the states
(h ps://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/09pdf/08-1521.pdf). Now only three provisions in the Bill of
Rights have not been explicitly incorporated. Timbs addressed one of these: the “no excessive ﬁnes”
provision in the Eighth Amendment. The other two are the grand jury clause and the Thirteenth
Amendment’s rule against quartering troops in times of peace.
The Eighth Amendment encompasses three “parallel limitations”
(h ps://www.westlaw.com/Document/I9982bd115a2a11dbbd2dfa5ce1d08a25/View/FullText.html?
transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=cblt1.0) on government’s power to
punish: the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the Excessive Bail Clause, and the Excessive Fines
Clause. Together these clauses operate to secure a single, fundamental right to be free from excessive
punishments. Timbs now eliminates any further ambiguity—the context is criminal asset forfeiture
(h ps://www.westlaw.com/Document/I9982bd115a2a11dbbd2dfa5ce1d08a25/View/FullText.html?
transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=cblt1.0).
In the winter of 2012, after his father died, Tyson Timbs received around $73,000 in life-insurance
proceeds (h ps://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/17/171091/33939/20180131162915070_Petition%20for%20a%20Writ%20of%20Certiorari%20Timbs%20et%20al
%20v%20State%20of%20Indiana.pdf). He used $41,558.30 to buy a car—the Land Rover LR2. He had
recently moved to Marion, Indiana, intending to live with an aunt while he worked on rebuilding his
life. Back home in St. Mary’s, Ohio, he became addicted to hydrocodone—an opioid medication—
prescribed to him for an injury suﬀered at work. When he could no longer ﬁnd the drug on the street, he
began using heroin.
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Land Rover LR2. Photo by Kelly Blue Book
After his father’s death, he began using heroin heavily. With a new Land Rover and in excess of $31,000
left to spend, Timbs began driving the vehicle to Richmond, Indiana, and Ohio—sometimes on a daily
basis—to buy heroin for his personal use. When his money ran out, he began looking for new ways to
fund his addiction. With the help of a conﬁdential informant, he arranged several drug transactions with
undercover oﬃcers.
On the ﬁrst occasion, Timbs drove across Marion in the Land Rover and sold oﬃcers two grams of
heroin for $225. A few days later, he walked from his aunt’s house to a nearby gas station, where he sold
oﬃcers another two grams for $160. While driving to a third transaction, Timbs was pulled over and
arrested yet no drugs were found in the vehicle. The Land Rover was seized. The State of Indiana
charged Timbs with two counts of dealing a Schedule I controlled substance and one count of felony
conspiracy to commit theft. Timbs pleaded guilty to one count of dealing and to the count of conspiracy
to commit theft. The trial court sentenced (h ps://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/17/171091/33939/20180131162915070_Petition%20for%20a%20Writ%20of%20Certiorari%20Timbs%20et%20al
%20v%20State%20of%20Indiana.pdf) him to six years, with the ﬁrst year to be served in home detention
and the remaining ﬁve years on probation. The state court also ordered Timbs to forfeit his Land Rover
on the theory that he had used the car to transport drugs.
In the Supreme Court, Timbs argued that protection from excessive ﬁnes has a long history in our legal
tradition, dating as far back as the reign of King Henry II
(h ps://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/17/171091/33939/20180131162915070_Petition%20for%20a%20Writ%20of%20Certiorari%20Timbs%20et%20al
%20v%20State%20of%20Indiana.pdf), who ruled England in the 12th century
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(h p://www.scotusblog.com/2018/11/argument-preview-justices-to-consider-whether-eighthamendment-ban-on-excessive-ﬁnes-applies-to-the-states/). When the Eighth Amendment was ratiﬁed in
the 1790s, Timbs noted, “nine of the 13 states (h ps://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/17/171091/33939/20180131162915070_Petition%20for%20a%20Writ%20of%20Certiorari%20Timbs%20et%20al
%20v%20State%20of%20Indiana.pdf) at the time had constitutional provisions guarding against
excessive ﬁnes.” In 1868, when the 14th Amendment was ratiﬁed, all of the states included protection
from excessive ﬁnes in their constitutions, and “all but two of the 37 states
(h ps://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/17/171091/33939/20180131162915070_Petition%20for%20a%20Writ%20of%20Certiorari%20Timbs%20et%20al
%20v%20State%20of%20Indiana.pdf) did so using language that mirrored the language of the federal
constitution’s excessive ﬁnes clause.”
Timbs further argued that the 14th Amendment was ratiﬁed to “combat the tactics deployed by southern
states (h p://www.scotusblog.com/2018/11/argument-preview-justices-to-consider-whether-eighthamendment-ban-on-excessive-ﬁnes-applies-to-the-states/) in the years after the Civil War to oppress
their African American citizens, including a variety of ﬁnes and forfeitures.” For example
(h p://www.scotusblog.com/2018/11/argument-preview-justices-to-consider-whether-eighthamendment-ban-on-excessive-ﬁnes-applies-to-the-states/), Alabama law imposed a ﬁne of “up to $1,000
and six months in jail for performing an interracial marriage,” while teaching at African American
schools without a special license was “punishable by a ﬁne of up to $500 in Florida.” The right to be free
from excessive ﬁnes is still a fundamental right, Timbs proclaimed. Some states will go so far as to jail
people who do not pay their ﬁnes on time (h p://www.scotusblog.com/2018/11/argument-previewjustices-to-consider-whether-eighth-amendment-ban-on-excessive-ﬁnes-applies-to-the-states/). And,
even if people do not lose their freedom as a result of ﬁnes, the ﬁnes can have serious repercussions
(h p://www.scotusblog.com/2018/11/argument-preview-justices-to-consider-whether-eighthamendment-ban-on-excessive-ﬁnes-applies-to-the-states/)— including the loss of driving privileges or
the right to vote.
Timbs argued that states are likely to abuse the right to be free from excessive ﬁnes, because they can’t
resist the temptation to use ﬁnes as an opportunity to raise revenue
(h p://www.scotusblog.com/2018/11/argument-preview-justices-to-consider-whether-eighthamendment-ban-on-excessive-ﬁnes-applies-to-the-states/) without raising taxes. In 2012, he told the
justices, “agencies in 26 States and the District of Columbia took in more than $254 million
(h ps://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/17/171091/33939/20180131162915070_Petition%20for%20a%20Writ%20of%20Certiorari%20Timbs%20et%20al
%20v%20State%20of%20Indiana.pdf) through forfeiture under state laws alone.” Excessive ﬁnes are a
particular problem in Indiana, he noted, “where state laws allow prosecutors to outsource forfeiture
(h ps://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/17/171091/33939/20180131162915070_Petition%20for%20a%20Writ%20of%20Certiorari%20Timbs%20et%20al
%20v%20State%20of%20Indiana.pdf) cases to private lawyers, who take the cases on contingent fees and
pocket hundreds of thousands of dollars every year based on forfeitures.” The First Circuit has grappled
(h ps://www.westlaw.com/Document/I9a91d5dfd88311e28578f7ccc38dcbee/View/FullText.html?
transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=cblt1.0) with this problem and has
required courts to consider an additional factor as well—would the contemplated ﬁne or forfeiture be so
severe as to destroy a defendant’s livelihood? This additional analysis of the excessiveness inquiry
represents a major departure taken by the majority of courts.
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The State of Indiana suggested that the excessive ﬁnes clause does not apply to Timbs’ case because he is
complaining about the forfeiture of property used to violate the law, known as an “in rem” forfeiture,
which was not traditionally regarded as a penalty
(h ps://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia01d68914b3611daa926e0f707ed0a55/View/FullText.html?
transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=cblt1.0). Indiana maintained the clause
applies only to payments imposed as punishment. The state argued this is consistent with the problem
that the excessive ﬁnes clause was intended to target, which was “to prevent judges from incarcerating
individuals on the basis of unpayable discretionary ﬁnes.”
The State of Indiana advised that even if the excessive ﬁnes clause does extend to in rem forfeiture, there
is no reason to interpret the clause to apply to the states. Indiana argued the Supreme Court should not
look generally at whether there is a right to be free of excessive ﬁnes, but instead should look at the
speciﬁc right that Timbs is asserting in the case at bar—“the right to be free of forfeitures of property
whose value far outweighs the seriousness of the crime.” The state maintained there is no deeply rooted
historical tradition (h p://www.scotusblog.com/2018/11/argument-preview-justices-to-considerwhether-eighth-amendment-ban-on-excessive-ﬁnes-applies-to-the-states/) supporting such a right. To
the contrary, property forfeitures have been common, even when the consequences have been
“draconian (h ps://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/17/171091/33939/20180131162915070_Petition%20for%20a%20Writ%20of%20Certiorari%20Timbs%20et%20al
%20v%20State%20of%20Indiana.pdf) and even when the owner of the property is innocent.” For
example, the Supreme Court upheld the forfeiture of nonobscene material in Alexander v. United States
(h ps://www.westlaw.com/Document/I9982bd115a2a11dbbd2dfa5ce1d08a25/View/FullText.html?
transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=cblt1.0). The defendants owned several
pornography stores and the conviction resulted from the possession of several magazines and videos.
The defendant was sentenced to six years in prison, ﬁned $100,000 and the entire enterprise was
forfeited. The enterprise included nine million dollars he had received as proceeds from the enterprise.
The state further argued, despite the harsh results of forfeitures, courts did not apply the excessive ﬁnes
clause to property forfeitures (h p://www.scotusblog.com/2018/11/argument-preview-justices-toconsider-whether-eighth-amendment-ban-on-excessive-ﬁnes-applies-to-the-states/) until 1992, which
“strongly implies that no one understood the Excessive Fines Clause to impose a proportionality
(h ps://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/17/171091/33939/20180131162915070_Petition%20for%20a%20Writ%20of%20Certiorari%20Timbs%20et%20al
%20v%20State%20of%20Indiana.pdf) requirement on these forfeitures.” For example, property owners
have challenged the constitutionality of forfeitures under other provisions in the Constitution, such as
the right to a jury trial or due process, but not the excessive ﬁnes clause
(h p://www.scotusblog.com/2018/11/argument-preview-justices-to-consider-whether-eighthamendment-ban-on-excessive-ﬁnes-applies-to-the-states/).
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Timbs’ petition for review garnered support from a wide range of groups
(h p://www.scotusblog.com/2018/06/ﬁve-new-grants-one-cvsg-but-no-arlenes-ﬂowers/). The U.S.
Chamber of Commerce argued in an amicus curiae brief that “state and local legislatures are authorizing
—and executive oﬃcials are seeking—excessive ﬁnes and forfeitures for relatively modest violations of
the law.” Although the Eighth Amendment’s excessive ﬁnes clause acts as a check on excessive ﬁnes
imposed by the federal government (h p://www.scotusblog.com/2018/06/ﬁve-new-grants-one-cvsg-butno-arlenes-ﬂowers/), the Chamber explained, the “lack of a uniform, similar constraint on the
governments in the 50 states is needlessly driving up costs for businesses, increasing prices for consumer
goods and services, and undermining economic growth.”
The Southern Poverty Law Center added in a separate amicus curiae brief that state governments are
using ﬁnes and forfeitures simply to generate revenue to fund a “burgeoning prison population”
(h p://www.scotusblog.com/2018/06/ﬁve-new-grants-one-cvsg-but-no-arlenes-ﬂowers/) without
needing to raise taxes. The SPLC argued this focus on revenue generation
(h p://www.scotusblog.com/2018/06/ﬁve-new-grants-one-cvsg-but-no-arlenes-ﬂowers/) can lead to
“unconstitutional and racially motivated behavior by law enforcement and municipal employees.” The
center asserted, “fees and ﬁnes mean that even the most casual encounter with the criminal justice
system can have catastrophic results (h p://www.scotusblog.com/2018/06/ﬁve-new-grants-one-cvsg-butno-arlenes-ﬂowers/).” This can ultimately have implications on everything, from ability to pay child
support to credit ratings and even leading to incarceration for failing to pay the ﬁnes.
Ultimately, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause is an
incorporated protection (h ps://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/18pdf/17-1091_5536.pdf) applicable to
the states. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg authored the opinion, agreeing with Timbs that the Excessive
Fines Clause has a historic tradition dating back to the colonial era. Ginsburg reasoned that the clause is
so “fundamental to our ordered liberty” and so “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition”
that its incorporation is required.
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